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KEY=SEPOY - MICHAEL ALISSON

THE SEPOY AND THE RAJ

THE INDIAN ARMY, 1860-1940

[Springer](#) **This is the first scholarly study of the subject for twenty years, and the only one based on extensive archival research. The Indian Army conquered India for the British, and protected the Raj against its enemies within and without. In this evocative and compassionate work, David Omissi examines the origins, motives and protests of the several million Indian peasant- soldiers who served the colonial power.**

ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN MILITARY STRATEGY, 1940-1943

INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, 1940-1965

[Government Printing Office](#) **CMH Pub 50-1-1. Defense Studies Series. Discusses the evolution of the services' racial policies and practices between World War II and 1965 during the period when black servicemen and women were integrated into the Nation's military units.**

GLOBAL LOGISTICS AND STRATEGY, 1940-1943

U.S. Army logistics, primarily of ground forces, in its relation to global strategy; the treatment is from the viewpoint of the central administration in Washington--Joint and Combined Chiefs of Staff, the War Department General Staff, and the Services of Supply.

THE EDUCATION OF AN ARMY

BRITISH MILITARY THOUGHT, 1815-1940

[Chicago](#) : U. of Chicago P.

MILITARY REVIEW

INTELLIGENCE AND STRATEGY

SELECTED ESSAYS

[Routledge](#) John Ferris' work in strategic and intelligence history is widely praised for its originality and the breadth of its research. At last his major pioneering articles are now available in this one single volume. In *Intelligence and Strategy* these essential articles have been fundamentally revised to incorporate new evidence and information withheld by governments when they were first published. This volume reshapes the study of communications intelligence by tracing Britain's development of cipher machines providing the context to Ultra and Enigma, and by explaining how British and German signals intelligence shaped the desert war. The author also explains how intelligence affected British strategy and diplomacy from 1874 to 1940 and world diplomacy during the 1930s and the Second World War. Finally he traces the roots for contemporary intelligence, and analyzes intelligence and the RMA as well as the role of intelligence in the 2003 Gulf War. This volume ultimately brings new light to our understanding of the relations between intelligence, strategy and diplomacy between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 21st century.

MILITARY TRAINING IN THE BRITISH ARMY, 1940-1944

FROM DUNKIRK TO D-DAY

[Psychology Press](#) In this study, the author traces the reasons for the British Army's tactical weakness in Normandy to flaws in its training in Britain. The armour suffered from failures of experience. Disagreements between General Montgomery and the War Office exacerbated matters.

BRITISH STRATEGIC BOMBING POLICY THROUGH 1940

POLITICS, ATTITUDES, AND THE FORMATION OF A LASTING PATTERN

[Edwin Mellen Press](#) This work traces British governmental thought, policy, and action regarding strategic bombing from World War I to the end of 1940, the year in which the relatively unprofitable area-bombing campaign began. Policy-making at both the cabinet level and top level of the RAF is examined.

STRATEGIC MILITARY SURPRISE

INITIATIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES

[Transaction Publishers](#)

2002

[Walter de Gruyter](#) Annually published since 1930, the International bibliography of Historical Sciences (IBOHS) is an international bibliography of the most important historical monographs and periodical articles published throughout the world, which deal with history from the earliest to the most recent times. The works are arranged systematically according to period, region or historical discipline, and within this classification alphabetically. The bibliography contains a geographical index and indexes of persons and authors.

HISTORICAL DICTIONARY OF THE 1940S

[M.E. Sharpe](#) Contains entries for individuals, institutions, and events, focusing mostly on the U.S. Entries cover topics in science, history, literature, theater and entertainment, and many other areas.

WAR FROM THE TOP

GERMAN AND BRITISH MILITARY DECISION MAKING DURING WORLD WAR II

[Indiana University Press](#) "Wilt writes... well and offers many sound perceptions." -- Choice "... a stimulating book... a timely warning against overindulgence in hindsight in evaluating the great issues of the war..." -- Parameters "... a significant new study... a clearly written, excellent book..." -- Airpower Journal "... an impressive work of scholarship..." -- British

Politics Group Newsletter "Wilt's comparative approach permits us fresh perspectives on both sides of the war. Moreover, Wilt has chosen to compare two of the major rival belligerents at the most stimulating and interesting level at which such comparison might be made, the level of the summit of decision making -- with the magnetic figures of Hitler and Churchill playing major roles in his narrative and analysis." -- Russell F. Weigley "This is a masterful treatment of a complex subject and a must read book for anyone writing about the Second World War." -- The Historian

THE DRAFT, 1940-1973

"Individual liberty is ingrained in American culture. Yet, in contrast to this cherished ideal, American men were inducted into military service under a system that flourished for more than twenty years before its rationalization was seriously questioned by more than a small minority of citizens." "Analyzing this paradox, George Flynn provides the first comprehensive look at an institution that managed to sustain political and public favor through two wars before dying out under a barrage of protests during a third. Placing the American draft within a historical context, he shows how social and political considerations determined the character of conscription in the United States." "The draft developed as it did, he argues, not mainly because of military needs or strategy, but because of political decisions initiated by civilians with nonmilitary agendas. Explaining why the draft remained relatively immune to political criticism prior to the Vietnam conflict, Flynn chronicles the draft's military and strategic successes and failures in America's mid-century wars. He shows how major institutions and lobbies representing science, education, and various professions and religions influenced it and how, ultimately and ironically, the selective character of the draft eventually made the system inequitable and helped cause its downfall."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved

A GUIDE TO THE STUDY AND USE OF MILITARY HISTORY

This Guide to the Study and Use of Military History is designed to foster an appreciation of the value of military history and explain its uses and the resources available for its study. It is not a work to be read and lightly tossed aside, but one the career soldier should read again or use as a reference at those times during his career when necessity or leisure turns him to the contemplation of the military past.

BRITAIN, TURKEY AND THE SOVIET UNION, 1940-45

STRATEGY, DIPLOMACY AND INTELLIGENCE IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

[Springer](#) This book draws on the latest archival releases - including those from the secret world of British intelligence - to offer the first comprehensive analysis of Anglo-Turkish relations during the Second World War, with a particular emphasis on Turkey's place in the changing relationship between Britain and the Soviet Union.

SOURCES OF WEAPON SYSTEMS INNOVATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

THE ROLE OF IN-HOUSE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 1945-2000

[DIANE Publishing](#) Contents: (1) Intro.: The Sources of Weapon Systems Innovation; (2) R&D in the Army: Changing Institutional Patterns of Army R& D after World War II; The Content of R&D in the Arsenal System; The Decline of the Arsenal System; (3) R&D in the Navy: Bureau of Ordnance; Bureau of Aeronautics; Bureau of Ships; From Bureaus and Laboratories to System Commands and Research Centers; (4) R&D in the Air Force: From Army Air Corps to U.S. Air Force, 1907-1950; Growth and Diversification: The Air Research and Development Command, 1950-1961; Reintegration: R&D in the Air Force Systems Command, 1961-1991; Coming Full Circle: Patterns of Organizational Change in Air Force R&D Since 1945; (5) Review and Retrospect. Biblio.

WAR, STRATEGY, AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS

[Cambridge University Press](#) This collection of articles represents Professor Williamson Murray's efforts to elucidate the role that history should play in thinking about both the present and the future. They reflect three disparate themes in Professor Murray's work: his deep fascination with history and those who have acted in the past; his fascination with the similarities in human behavior between the past and the present; and his belief that the study of military and strategic history can be of real use to those who will confront the

daunting problems of war and peace in the twenty-first century. The first group of essays addresses the relevance of history to an understanding of the present and to an understanding of the possibilities of the future. The second addresses the possible direct uses of history to think through the problems involved in the creation of effective military institutions. The final group represents historical case studies that serve to illuminate the present.

INTELLIGENCE AND ANGLO-AMERICAN AIR SUPPORT IN WORLD WAR TWO

THE WESTERN DESERT AND TUNISIA, 1940-43

[Springer](#) Among the greatest developments in conventional war since 1914 has been the rise of air/land power - the interaction between air forces and armies in military operations. This book examines the forging of an air support system that was used with success for the remainder of the war, the principles of which have applied ever since.

HITLER'S WAR

GERMAN MILITARY STRATEGY, 1940-1945

[Arms & Armour](#) This is a closely argued and wide-ranging assessment of just how, with so many alternatives open, the German High Command chose the path that led, ultimately, to its own destruction. Heinz Magenheimer examines in detail the options that were open to the Germans as the war progressed. He identifies the crucial moments at which fateful decisions needed to be taken and considers how decisions different from those actually taken could have propelled the conflict in entirely different directions. Using the very latest source material, in particular new research from Soviet/Russian sources, the author analyses motives and objectives and considers the opportunities taken or rejected, concentrating especially on specific phases of the conflict.

MILITARY IDENTITIES

THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM, THE BRITISH ARMY, AND THE BRITISH PEOPLE C.1870-2000

[Oxford University Press](#) Based upon a combination of official papers, private papers and personal reminiscences, and upon research in the National Archives, regimental museums and collections, and other depositories, this book challenges the assumptions of both the exponents and detractors of the regimental system. The author shows that there was not one, but several, regimental systems and he demonstrates that localized recruiting was usually a failure. Many regiments were never able to draw more than a small proportion of their recruits from their own districts. He shows that regimental loyalties were not a primordial force; regimental authorities had to create them and in the late nineteenth century they manufactured new traditions with gusto, whilst in both world wars regimental postings quickly broke down and regiments had to take recruits from wherever they could find them. French also argues that the notion that the British army was bad at fighting big battles because the regimental system created a parochial military culture is facile.

CONTEMPORARY MILITARY CULTURE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

US AND UK ARMED FORCES IN THE 21ST CENTURY

[Routledge](#) This book explores and compares the contemporary military cultures of the United States and the United Kingdom. The last decade has witnessed astonishing global events, from 9/11 and military operations in Afghanistan in the same year, to the military intervention in Libya in 2011. Western military forces have been involved in all of these campaigns and have been engaged in continuous military operations for over ten years. It is therefore now apt to focus a spotlight on the military cultures of these state-based armed forces. This book examines how contemporary American and British military culture is formed, focusing explicitly on the six major military institutions. The author dedicates a chapter to each of these institutions with each one sharing a unifying analytical framework. These chapters explore the formation and sustenance of US/UK military culture under the rubric of common themes that include social origins, transformative events, leaders, approaches to war, technology and contemporary identity. To conclude, the book considers the impact of the War on Terror on the military cultures of the US and UK, as well as likely directions for the future. This book will be of much interest to students of military studies, strategic studies, security studies and comparative politics.

THE ITALIAN BLITZ 1940-43

BOMBER COMMAND'S WAR AGAINST MUSSOLINI'S CITIES, DOCKS AND FACTORIES

[Bloomsbury Publishing](#) Between June 1940 and August 1943, RAF Bomber Command undertook a little-known strategic bombing campaign in Europe. The target was Mussolini's Italy. This air campaign was a key part of the strategic policy of Britain from 1940 to 1943, which aimed at securing Italy's early surrender. However, it posed unique challenges, not least of which was Italy's natural defences of distance and the Alps. The bombing campaign against Italy can be divided into a number of phases, with each one having its own specific goals such as affecting Italian war production or hindering the Italian Navy's war in the Mediterranean. However, each also furthered the ultimate aim of forcing Italy's final capitulation, demonstrating that the tactic of area-bombing was not just about the destruction of an enemy's cities, as it could also fulfil wider strategic and political objectives. Indeed, the intensity and frequency of attack was greatly controlled, and the heavy bombing of Italy was only ever sanctioned by Britain's civilian war leaders to achieve both military and political goals. The issue of target-selection was also subject to a similar political restriction; cities and ports like Milan, Turin, Genoa and La Spezia were sanctioned under an official Directive, but other places, such as Verona, Venice, Florence and, above all, Rome, remained off-limits. This fascinating title from British strategic and military history expert Dr Richard Worrall explores the political, motivational and strategic challenges of the campaign in full. His thorough analysis and meticulous research is supported by specially commissioned artwork, maps, and contemporary photographs.

HITLER'S WAR

GERMANY'S KEY STRATEGIC DECISIONS, 1940-1945

[Burns & Oates](#) This is the book that answers the question: Could Germany have won World War Two? What if Germany's key strategic decisions had been different? What would have happened?

THE POLITICS AND STRATEGY OF CLANDESTINE WAR

SPECIAL OPERATION EXECUTIVE, 1940-1946

[Taylor & Francis](#) This fascinating new collection of essays on Britain's Special Operations Executive (SOE) explores the non-military aspects of British special operations in the Second World War. It details how SOE was established in the summer of 1940 to set Europe ablaze, as Churchill memorably put it. This was a task it was meant to achieve by detonating popular resistance against Axis rule, and nurturing secret armies, which might be capable of providing military and other forms of assistance for British forces when they were once again able to return to the offensive and conduct land operations in Europe. The importance of the collection, however, goes beyond merely illuminating aspects of SOE's work which have largely been overlooked in previous scholarship. More significantly, by situating SOE within the context of Britain's broader political needs, the essays demonstrate the extent to which SOE came to epitomise and embody the range of skills that are found in today's secret service organisations. SOE showed itself capable of operating on a global scale and developing the necessary expertise, equipment and personnel to conduct activities across the whole spectrum of what we have come to know as covert operations. By bringing SOE's activities into sharper focus and exposing the scale of its involvement in Britain's wartime external relations, the essays echo current thinking on the place of the so-called secret world in international politics.

THE SOVIET HIGH COMMAND: A MILITARY-POLITICAL HISTORY, 1918-1941

A MILITARY POLITICAL HISTORY, 1918-1941

[Routledge](#) An objective and documentary history of the earliest origins and formative years of the Workers-Peasants Red Army from the Civil War to the initial disasters of the war with Germany, the Great Patriotic War, culminating in the "battle for Moscow" in November-December 1941.

THE MILITARY STRATEGY OF THE SOVIET UNION

A HISTORY

[Routledge](#) **Armed revolution and civil war gave birth to the Soviet Union, world War II propelled it to global pre-eminence, and the Cold War contributed to the Soviet Union's demise. Given Marxism-Leninism's ideological preoccupation with war and threats of war, it is understandable that the spectre of war should play a vital role in the life and fate of the Soviet state. This study of Soviet military strategy is based upon the twin pillars of Soviet political-military actions and Soviet writings on the subject of military strategy. Thanks to the policy of glasnost, it incorporates Soviet materials hitherto unavailable in the West. It aims to be not simply a retrospective account of what was, but to form part of the context for what will be in the future.**

GEOPOLITICS, GEOGRAPHY AND STRATEGIC HISTORY

[Taylor & Francis](#) **This volume examines geopolitics by looking at the interaction between geography, strategy and history. This book addresses three interrelated questions: why does the geographical scope of political objectives and subsequent strategy of states change? How do these changes occur? Over what period of time do these changes occur? The theories of Sir Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman are examined in order to provide an analytical narrative for five case studies, four historical and one contemporary. Taken together they offer the prospect of converting descriptions of historical change into analytic explanations, thereby highlighting the importance of a number of commonly overlooked variables. In addition, the case studies will illuminate the challenges that states face when attempting to change the scope of their foreign policy and geo-strategy in response to shifts in the geopolitical reality. This book breaks new ground in seeking to provide a way to understand why and how the geographical scope of political objectives and subsequent strategy both expands and contracts. This book will be of much interest to students of geopolitics, strategic studies, military history, and international relations.**

HISTORICAL ABSTRACTS

TWENTIETH CENTURY ABSTRACTS, 1914-2000

ANATOMY OF A CAMPAIGN

[Cambridge University Press](#) **Senior military commander assesses the reasons behind the ignominious failure of the British campaign in Norway in 1940.**

STRATEGY FOR CHAOS

REVOLUTIONS IN MILITARY AFFAIRS AND THE EVIDENCE OF HISTORY

[Routledge](#) **In this volume, Professor Colin Gray develops and applies the theory and scholarship on the allegedly historical practice of the 'Revolution in Military Affairs' (RMA), in order to improve our comprehension of how and why strategy 'works'. The author explores the RMA hypothesis both theoretically and historically. The book argues that the conduct of an RMA has to be examined as a form of strategic behaviour, which means that, of necessity, it must "work" as strategy works. The great RMA debate of the 1990s is reviewed empathetically, though sceptically, by the author, with every major school of thought allowed its day in court. The author presents three historical RMAs as case studies for his argument: those arguably revealed in the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon; in World War I; and in the nuclear age. The focus of his analysis is how these grand RMAs functioned strategically. The conclusions that he draws from these empirical exercises are then applied to help us understand what, indeed, is - and what is not - happening with the much vaunted information-technology-led RMA of today.**

HOLLAND 1940

THE LUFTWAFFE'S FIRST SETBACK IN THE WEST

[Bloomsbury Publishing](#) **The history of how the Luftwaffe planned to knock out Holland in a surgical, lightning campaign, but instead suffered wounds against the outnumbered but effective Dutch that would come to haunt them in the Battle of Britain. From the perspective of the German High Command, its invasion of the Netherlands on May 10, 1940 was**

supposed to be a lightning fast surgical strike, aimed at shoring up the right flank of the Wehrmacht's massive assault on France and Belgium. In a bold manoeuvre, the German Luftwaffe would launch what was at the time the largest airborne operation in history, calculating that surprise and speed would negate the need for a lengthy ground campaign or large numbers of ground troops, using paratroops and air-landing troops to capture key strategic point that would clear the path for the subsequent capitulation of main Dutch city and the government itself. The entire operation was expected to take only 24 hours. The actual campaign proved to be much less efficient and had devastating results for the Luftwaffe. The Netherlands possessed Europe's first fully integrated anti-aircraft network, coordinated from a central command as well as modern and competitive aircraft. Furthermore, the Dutch were not taken by surprise on May 10, 1940, as is often assumed in most histories, thanks to the efforts of Dutch intelligence services and an early radar system. By the end of May 10, only some of the German objectives had been achieved and the battle in Dutch skies and for Dutch airfields stalemated for a further four days. Finally on the fifth day of the invasion with its pre-campaign strategy having largely failed, the Luftwaffe resorted to the terror bombing of Rotterdam in a desperate and successful attempt to force the Dutch government to capitulate. While the Battle of the Netherlands can be seen as a tactical victory for Germany, strategically it has to be seen as the first major defeat for the Luftwaffe. Explaining the technical capabilities and campaign plans of the two sides, and charting how the battles were fought, this fascinating book re-examines and reassesses this little-known part of World War II. Dutch-speaking aviation analyst Ryan Noppen argues that while the air campaign against Holland was a tactical victory for Germany, the ability of the well-prepared but outnumbered Dutch to inflict heavy losses was a warning of what would come when the Luftwaffe launched the Battle of Britain.

MILITARY STRATEGY

Oxford University Press Since ancient times, poets, historians, and philosophers have contemplated warlords' exploits in battle and praised their ability to lead armies toward victory as the "art of the general." Today, this quality is designated military strategy. Military strategy plays a vital role in every conflict, because, as the United States' involvement in the Vietnam conflict showed, when the overarching strategy is weak it is possible to win every battle but still lose a war. Taking inspiration from the greatest military theoreticians of history, such as Sun Tzu, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Carl von Clausewitz, this Very Short Introduction highlights the dynamic relationship between the principal components of strategy: purpose, method, and means. Drawing on paradigmatic examples, from Hannibal's war against Rome to Napoleon's victory at Austerlitz, from the Allies' campaign to overwhelm Hitler's fortress to the terror attacks of September 11, Antulio J. Echevarria II vividly illustrates the factors contributing to the success or failure of military strategy. Echevarria describes the major types of military strategy and their advantages and disadvantages: annihilation and dislocation; attrition and exhaustion; deterrence and coercion; terror and terrorism; targeted killing; and cyber power. He also explores the emerging nano- and bio-genetic technologies and explains how they are affecting today's military strategy. Clear and engaging, this book shows that military strategy is essential for understanding major events of the past and becomes even more critical today, in a world increasingly threatened by weapons of mass destruction, terrorist attacks, and new dimensions of conflict, such as cyberwar and space.

STRATEGY AND POLITICS

Routledge This book examines the subject of strategy and its relationship with politics. Despite the fact that strategy is always the product of political process, the relationship between the two concepts and their ancillary activities has scarcely been touched by scholars. This book corrects that serious deficiency, and explains the high relevance of political factors for matters of general defence. Each chapter aims to show how and why strategy and politics interact and how this interaction has had significant consequences historically. Neither strategy nor politics can make sense if considered alone. Strategy requires direction that can only be provided by political process, while politics cannot be implemented without strategy. In summary, this volume will explain: what strategy is (and is not) why strategy is essential what strategy does and how it does it how strategy is made and executed Written by a leading scholar and former practitioner, this book will be essential reading for all students of military strategy, strategic studies, security studies and war and conflict studies.

STRATEGIC AIR WARFARE : AN INTERVIEW WITH GENERALS...

DIANE Publishing

GERMAN CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA: PLANNING AND OPERATIONS (1940-1942)

WW2: STRATEGIC & OPERATIONAL PLANNING: DIRECTIVE BARBAROSSA, THE INITIAL OPERATIONS, GERMAN ATTACK ON MOSCOW, OFFENSIVE IN THE CAUCASUS & BATTLE FOR STALINGRAD

[e-artnow](#) The aim of this edition is to present in a comprehensive way the strategy and military operations of the German army in the attack on Russia in World War 2. The narrative starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends at the time of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle for Stalingrad. Contents: Strategic Planning Operational Planning The Initial Operations (22 June-31 July 1941) Planning for Future Operations The Diversion and Reassembly The German Attack on Moscow The Russian Counteroffensive (December 1941-February 1942) Preliminary Planning for a German Offensive in the Caucasus, 1942 Preparations for the German Summer Offensive Initial Operations and New Plans (July 1942) The Period of Stagnation (August-October 1942) Critical Analysis of the German Summer Offensive in 1942 List of German Military Leaders (July 1940-November 1942) Chronology of the Events

MAKERS OF MODERN STRATEGY FROM MACHIAVELLI TO THE NUCLEAR AGE

[Princeton University Press](#) The essays in this volume analyze war, its strategic characteristics and its political and social functions, over the past five centuries. The diversity of its themes and the broad perspectives applied to them make the book a work of general history as much as a history of the theory and practice of war from the Renaissance to the present. *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* takes the first part of its title from an earlier collection of essays, published by Princeton University Press in 1943, which became a classic of historical scholarship. Three essays are repinted from the earlier book; four others have been extensively revised. The rest--twenty-two essays--are new. The subjects addressed range from major theorists and political and military leaders to impersonal forces. Machiavelli, Clausewitz, and Marx and Engels are discussed, as are Napoleon, Churchill, and Mao. Other essays trace the interaction of theory and experience over generations--the evolution of American strategy, for instance, or the emergence of revolutionary war in the modern world. Still others analyze the strategy of particular conflicts--the First and Second World Wars--or the relationship between technology, policy, and war in the nuclear age. Whatever its theme, each essay places the specifics of military thought and action in their political, social, and economic environment. Together the contributors have produced a book that reinterprets and illuminates war, one of the most powerful forces in history and one that cannot be controlled in the future without an understanding of its past.

PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

SMALL POWERS IN THE AGE OF TOTAL WAR, 1900-1940

[BRILL](#) In the period 1900-1940 the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland reacted in divergent ways to the same foreign military threats. This volume argues that their internal politics and politico-military strategic culture are vital keys to understanding those differences.

INTELLIGENCE AND STRATEGY

SELECTED ESSAYS

[Routledge](#) John Ferris' work in strategic and intelligence history is widely praised for its originality and the breadth of its research. At last his major pioneering articles are now available in this one single volume. In *Intelligence and Strategy* these essential articles have been fundamentally revised to incorporate new evidence and information withheld by governments when they were first published. This volume reshapes the study of communications intelligence by tracing Britain's development of cipher machines providing the context to Ultra and Enigma, and by explaining how British and German signals intelligence shaped the desert war. The author also explains how intelligence affected British strategy and diplomacy from 1874 to 1940 and world diplomacy during the 1930s and the Second World War. Finally he traces the roots for contemporary intelligence, and analyzes intelligence and the RMA as well as the role of intelligence in the 2003 Gulf War. This volume ultimately brings new light to our understanding of the relations between intelligence, strategy and diplomacy between the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 21st century.